Learning to perceive and perceiving to learn by Press, Clare et al.
BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online
Press, Clare and Kok, P. and Yon, Daniel (2020) Learning to perceive and




Please refer to usage guidelines at https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/policies.html or alternatively
contact lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk.
Accepted in Trends in Cognitive Sciences on 10th January, 2020 
Learning to Perceive and Perceiving to Learn 
Clare Press1*, Peter Kok2, and Daniel Yon1,3 
1 Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London 
2 Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, UCL 
3 Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths, University of London 
* Correspondence: c.press@bbk.ac.uk (C. Press) 
 
We thank Corlett for his thought-provoking response [1] to our recent article [2]. Corlett shares 
our concerns about inconsistencies in theories of perceptual prediction and highlights some 
reminiscent debates in learning theory. He also proposes why the perceptual prediction 
mechanisms may operate differently in the domain of action relative to other sensory cognition.  
Here, we highlight how we share the conviction that dialogue across disciplines will inform 
both models of perception and learning, but clarify that important distinctions between the 
explananda mean the theoretical puzzles are not reducible to each other. We also question 
whether action prediction mechanisms do indeed operate differently. 
Corlett considers how animals establish the relationships between events in their environment 
(cues and outcomes; model uncertainty), outlining debates over whether we should learn more 
from cues that strongly predict particular outcomes or cues where the ensuing outcomes are 
uncertain. We agree these debates are important for issues addressed in our article [2], 
concerning how we establish which events are 'out there' at the moment (sensory uncertainty). 
However, there are some important differences between the ways in which we resolve model 
and sensory uncertainty, and relatedly, between the particular debates in question. In the 
literature Corlett considers, this key puzzle concerns which cues animals attend to in order to 
build their predictive model of the environment. This differs from our focus on how perception 
of events changes when they are predicted (outcomes) rather than predictive (cues), and it is 
worth noting that differences in attention cannot explain all effects of prediction on perception 
[2]. While learning may therefore have been long implicated in some form in perception, 
consideration of attention towards cues is only one component of the perceptual puzzle.   
Perhaps most importantly, it is valuable to clarify that the opposing processes we propose are 
realised within hundreds of milliseconds during the presentation of single events, whereas the 
switch between sampling of predictive and uncertain cues highlighted by Corlett operates 
across many ‘trials’ – as the animal refines its estimates of causal relationships [3]. To recap, 
we propose that perception of expected events is initially upweighted, due to combination of 
the prior and likelihood to determine the posterior (Bayesian accounts). This process will 
typically generate veridical representations of our environment rapidly, though this will of 
course be ‘veridicality on average’ – as noted by Corlett, percepts may be erroneous when 
typical regularities are disrupted (e.g., illusions). However, if the posterior deviates sufficiently 
from the prior to generate surprise responses identified in the learning literature (relatively high 
KLD), the sensory gain is subsequently increased – in the order of hundreds of milliseconds 
after the event in question is presented [4,5]. Corlett considers that our proposed temporal 
order places the processing of surprise too late to be adaptive. We agree this would be a 
concern for delays in the order of trials – like proposed above in the learning literature between 
predictive and uncertain cues [3] – but less so delays in the order of milliseconds as we 
propose for perception. Such a delay may be necessary to allow us to achieve adaptive 
advantages associated with the use of expectations to generate both broadly veridical and 
informative percepts.  
Corlett also suggests that a predictive cancellation mechanism that pre-emptively suppresses 
the predicted consequences of action is key for determining whether we were the cause of 
events in the world, and that uncertainty-based inferences are not especially required during 
action. We challenge both of these points. While we agree that the ‘error’ between expected 
and actual action outcomes is a vital cue for computing agency, determining agency does not 
require action predictions to shape the percept in distinct (cancelling) ways. In fact, much 
recent work – including from our lab – suggests that they shape perception similarly to other 
types of prediction [1, e.g., 6]. It is important to note that our claims relate solely to sensory 
prediction mechanisms during action, and that sensory suppression generated when we move 
our eyes or limbs may reflect a non-specific suppression of all sensory input to a moving body 
part (Box 1; While suppression mechanisms may not therefore be predictive, a disruption in 
them could still lead to the relative upweighting of external sensory evidence when forming 
perceptual inferences [7]). We believe that the perceptual prediction paradox is still present 
when predictions are made during action, as it is crucial for us to generate robust 
representations of our actions rapidly in the face of sensory noise (veridicality) and remain 
sensitive to unexpected outcomes that occur as we move (informativeness).    
In conclusion, we believe that dialogue between different disciplines in perception and learning 
sheds complementary light on how animals like us deal with an uncertain environment. These 
debates reinvigorate older questions about how we continuously forge models of the world 
around us via our perceptual experiences, and raise new questions about how we use these 
to guide perception of what is here right now.  
     
Box 1. Generalised sensory suppression or predictive cancellation?  
Certain mechanisms attenuate perception during action, but do not differentially influence 
expected and unexpected events – and are therefore dissociable from prediction mechanisms 
[2]. For example, when we move we suppress all tactile input to a moving effector, perhaps 
due to spinal gating mechanisms [8]. This mechanism may explain some dissociations 
between influences of action on ‘body-related’ and ‘environment-related’ action outcomes [9]. 
Relatedly, ‘active inference’ predictive coding models propose that action initiation requires 
reduced processing across all sensory channels that could report on the present state of the 
to-be-moved effector [10], and if conceptualising action production as an additional task, 
classic working memory models would hypothesise reduced sensory processing when events 
are presented in combination with action [11]. Studies cited in support of cancellation 
frequently compare processing of predictable events presented during action against events 
when passive – or where the action and sensory events overlap less due to temporal 
misalignment – and generalised suppression likely therefore contributes to effects. We 
hypothesise that predictive ‘cancelling’ influences of action on perception [e.g., 12] will be 
determined by processes that operate after stimulus presentation rather than any that subtract 
information from the input, but make no claims about generalised suppression mechanisms.  
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